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Abstract—Today’s vehicles are becoming cyber-physical sys-
tems that do not only communicate with other vehicles but
also gather various information from hundreds of sensors within
them. These developments help create smart and connected (e.g.,
self-driving) vehicles that will introduce significant information
to drivers, manufactures, insurance companies and maintenance
service providers for various applications. One such application
that is becoming crucial with the introduction of self-driving
cars is the forensic analysis for traffic accidents. The utilization
of vehicle related data can be instrumental in post-accident
scenarios to find out the faulty party, particularly for self-driving
vehicles. With the opportunity of being able to access various
information on the cars, we propose a permissioned blockchain
framework among the various elements involved to manage
the collected vehicle related data. Specifically, we first integrate
Vehicular Public Key Management (VPKI) to the proposed
blockchain to provide membership establishment and privacy.
Next, we design a fragmented ledger that will store detailed data
related to vehicle such as maintenance information/history, car
diagnosis reports, etc. The proposed forensic framework enables
trustless, traceable and privacy-aware post-accident analysis with
minimal storage and processing overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s vehicles are becoming much smarter with special-
purpose sensors, control units and wireless adapters to monitor
their operations and communicate with their surroundings [1].
These contemporary smart vehicles are now considered as a
comprehensive cyber-physical systems (CPS) with commu-
nication, control and sensing components [2]. For instance,
Electronic Control Units (ECU) and On Board Units (OBUs)
can receive data from various on-board sensing devices to take
certain actions. The connections among the control units and
sensor devices are done via different types of networks such
as Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus, Local Interconnect
Network (LIN) Bus, Flexray, Bluetooth, etc. Such develop-
ments along with capabilities to sense and communicate with
the surroundings are enabling further developments such as
creation of autonomous vehicles which are also known as self-
driving cars that will revolutionize our lives.
The penetration of IoT technologies in vehicles enables
collection of enormous data from vehicles for various ap-
plications. For instance, most vehicles that are manufactured
in the last decade have on-board diagnostics (OBD) ports
which are used for retrieving vehicle controller diagnostics.
These ports are typically interfaced with a Wi-Fi, Bluetooth
or serial connection to supply data outside. Another major
development is the deployment of Event Data Recorders
(EDRs) by leading manufacturers such as GM, Ford, etc.
EDRs are meant to store incident data based on triggering
events. Finally, the future vehicles will be equipped with On-
board Units (OBUs) to enable connectivity among vehicles
and Road Side Units (RSUs) to provide collision avoidance
and congestion control. Such safety features will be realized
with the wireless Dedicated Short Range Communications
(DSRC) that will not only enable broadcasting of basic safety
messages (BSM) (i.e., Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)) but also
provide the means to communicate with the infrastructure
such as the traffic lights, railroad crossing etc. (i.e., Vehicle-
to-Infrastructure (V2I)). Although BSM is name of a spacial
message in DSRC specification, here it is used as a generic
name allocating all safety related messages [1].
Such capabilities as being able to collect data within and
around the vehicles can make a significant impact on ve-
hicular forensics that aims to investigate the reasons behind
the accidents. This field will become even more important
with the proliferation of self-driving cars which are prone
to failures and cyber attacks [3]. Typically, after an accident,
investigator specialists analyze the causes of the accident so
that disputes among parties can be resolved. The investigators
look at many different aspects including inspection of accident
site and vehicle. Site inspection contains physical evidences
such as scrub marks, position of vehicles, tire conditions etc.
In addition to those physical evidences digital data supplied
from OBD ports and EDR introduce valuable complementary
evidence for supporting the dispute resolution. Eventually, by
enabling to capture, store and transfer the vehicle data, the
puzzle including drivers, insurance companies, manufacturers
and law enforcement authorities can be solved [3], [4].
Even after utilizing EDR and OBD data, the accident in-
vestigation lacks certain features which are absolutely needed
for a comprehensive dispute resolution. These can be listed
as follows: 1) The obtained data does not include a compre-
hensive history of the vehicle due to limited storage (i.e., the
data is overwritten after a while); 2) The parties do not have
direct control on the extracted data, therefore they should trust
third parties which incurs questions about the integrity of data
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2Fig. 1. Digital Forensics Process Model [6]
3) There is no system for integrating data from all parties
including other vehicles, road conditions, manufacturers and
maintenance centers; 4) There is no vehicular forensics so-
lution to resolve a hit and run case other than third party
information such as surveillance cameras and eyewitnesses.
Therefore, in this paper, we address these points by propos-
ing Block4Forensic (B4F) framework, a blockchain-based
vehicular forensics system that will collect vehicles and related
business components under the same umbrella. In particular,
the proposed system 1) provides a lightweight privacy-aware
blockchain by gathering all related parties such as drivers,
maintenance centers, car manufacturers and law enforcement
without requiring a trusted third party in case of an incident;
and 2) introduces a vehicular forensics investigation frame-
work that harbors all necessary data for a comprehensive
vehicular forensics solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we describe the preliminaries related to all concepts and
provide a summary of the state of the art. In Section III we
introduce B4F framework. In Section IV, we explain BF4 with
its components. Section V is dedicated to future issues in
this emerging research area. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
1) Vehicular Forensics: Traditional vehicular forensics
deals with the physical evidences collected from an accident
scene, such as photographs, measurements, scrub marks etc.
Usage of vehicle generated data has attracted the interest of
the researchers [5], hence it is strengthening the hands of the
forensic investigators as they can find supporting evidences
from the digital subsystems of a vehicle. There are many con-
trollers and sensors in modern vehicles in different capabilities.
For a better driving experience almost every capability of the
vehicle is measured and reported.
When an accident occurs, incident first responders arrive
to the scene to identify and secure the digital devices for
keeping them forensically sound (preserving integrity of ev-
idence) by following the process shown in shown in Fig.
1. After securing and getting access to all related devices,
further examination and analysis are performed. This basically
means finding incident related data on the digital devices
such as finding traces of a cyber attack and failure of a
manufacturer component or mistake of a driver etc. At the
reporting phase, investigators prepare a report and testify and
present the evidence. Obviously, the most important factor for
the admissibility of the report is to verify that the evidence
devices have not been altered during the investigation. This
may be quite challenging as there is no universal standard
to collect, examine and analyze data from digital devices on
vehicles, drivers, and involved units. Therefore, a framework
that will enable convenient data collection and analysis is
needed. The framework should satisfy privacy of the user and
the stored data content should be clear to the user i.e., owner
of the data.
2) Event Data Recorders and On Board Diagnosis : Event
data recorder (EDR), informally named as “black box” is
a device placed in vehicles in order to collect data related
to crashes and accidents. In case of a dispute, investigators
come up with the most probable set up. The digital data
recorded by the EDR is widely used as a supporting evidence
in investigations for reconstructing the accident scene. When
a triggering event occurs - some among those events are the
airbag deployment, sudden speed changes above a threshold -
EDR captures and stores the state of the vehicle in a tamper
proof storage. It is known that EDR data is extracted by the
investigators through the on board diagnosis (OBD) port in
case of an incident. Meanwhile, the ownership of EDR data
and integrity of it is discussed in study [7] along with how
this data is used by Traffic Safety Administrator (NHTSA) and
other third parties for post-accident scenario reconstruction.
3) Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and
Basic Safety Messages (BSM): DSRC specification defines
the dedicated channels, standards and protocols for commu-
nication between connected vehicles. Among many different
messages, BSM is one of the most important one for safety-
related awareness between the vehicles. Part I of the BSM
includes high priority information about a vehicle such as
position, speed, size, brake status and ID of the vehicle and
also medium priority messages such as positional accuracy and
steering wheel angle. This scheme brings additional value in
the forensic investigation since the collected digital data will
not be solely related to the car itself but also related to the
participants surrounding it.
A. Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure - Vehicular Network
Security
In the networking layer of communication of connected ve-
hicles, IEEE 1609.2 standard is utilized for message integrity
and authentication [8].
The vehicular public-key infrastructure (VPKI), a simplified
version of which is shown in Fig. 2, utilized in IEEE 1609.2
is a highly complicated infrastructure specially tailored for
the needs of the transportation system. The main certification
authority (CA) generates, distributes, and revokes the digital
certificates. Proposed VPKI structure also deals with the pri-
vacy and security issues. According to the safety pilot model,
the certificates which constitute the pseudonym identity of the
vehicle are valid for only 5 minutes. That behavior provides
anonymity for the communicating parties and also it makes
the system strong against targeted attacks aiming privacy and
spoofing.
B. Blockchain
A blockchain is composed of blocks which are linked to
each other and secured cryptographically. This establishes a
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Fig. 2. A simplified representation of VPKI.
strong tie between blocks which guarantees the order of blocks
and provides an implicit strong timestamp mechanism, thus a
block is prevented from any altering without changing all of
its successors. This blockchain data structure can be shared to
build a distributed data structure called as shared ledger [9].
This working scheme of blockchain carries unique properties
such as relieving central authority trust, immutability, and
timestamping.
There are two types of blockchain structure, public and per-
missioned. For instance, Bitcoin and Ethereum fall into public
blockchain category where everyone is able to read and write
the ledger without any restriction (i.e., there is no membership
requirement). However, in permissioned blockchains [10], the
participants forms a members only club.
The process of adding a new block to the chain is carried out
via a protocol, which establishes consensus among participants
to confirm the new block. The implementation details of
consensus protocol (e.g., proof-of-work or POW) changes a
lot depending on the type of blockchain For instance, in
public blockchain, consensus is typically a form of hash puzzle
which requires finding a predefined hash value.This consensus
protocol brings a significant level of security on the chain
(withstand up to 50% of nodes are being malicious), but
at the cost of computational power and time. For instance,
Bitcoin’s maximum throughput is 7 transactions per second
and the consensus finality can take an hour.On the other hand,
permissioned blockchains utilize some kind of Byzantine fault
tolerant voting based algorithm as consensus mechanism, such
as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) or Stellar Con-
sensus Protocol (SCP) , which do not require computationally
expensive hash puzzle. As a result, reaching a consensus is
faster which means higher transaction throughput. However,
permissioned blockchains generally require more than two-
thirds of nodes to be trustworthy rather than 51%. More details
about consensus algorithms can be found in [?].
C. Current State of the Art in Vehicular Forensics
The use of the Digital Vehicular Forensics is increasing
in investigations. There are commercial products targeting
comprehensive data collection from the cars. iVe project from
Berla is a result of that effort, where their product has access
to EDR and OBD port. They also retrieve data from the
infotainment and telematics systems. The data is collected
on cloud storage. Authors in [4] offer a similar solution.
EDR and OBD ports are accessible by design and the data
is stored on the cloud. Although the authors in [12] do not
directly aim implementation for digital forensics, they offer
a framework mainly discussing guidelines named “forensic
by design”. The idea of blockchain utilization for vehicular
security is offered in [13]. The authors sketch possible use
cases for insurance companies or wireless software updates
for smart cars, however, their discussion lacks practical issues
such as membership management and scalability. For a proper
investigation non-repudiation is of great importance. There is
an implicit consensus in the research community that public
key cryptography produces reliable solutions for that issue
[14]. However, there is a need for a comprehensive applicable
and scalable framework in vehicular forensics research.
III. A BLOCKCHAIN FRAMEWORK VEHICULAR FORENSIC
The ultimate aim of vehicular forensics is to resolve disputes
and determine the faulty parts in case of an accident. The
developments in connected vehicles provide new opportunities
for forensic analysis by taking advantage of the IoT and
CPS features. Utilizing produced sensors data with decision
entities would allow building a comprehensive vehicular foren-
sic analysis. Considering involving multiple parties such as
manufacturers, drivers, insurance companies, law enforcement
etc., we first identify the key features for an effective and
trustworthy vehicular forensics framework.
A. Desired Features of Envisioned Forensic Analysis
The following key features are desired for Vehicular Foren-
sics:
• Integrity: The integrity of forensic data is very important
for resolving the disputes.
• Non-Repudiation: The parties should be held responsi-
ble for their actions by providing proof of the integrity.
• Relieve Single Point-of-Trust: The system should re-
move the assumption of trust reliance solely on a single
authority and provide an accountable trustworthiness of
each participant.
• Comprehensive Forensic Analysis: The system should
provide a comprehensive mechanism to accident analysis
by providing access to historical data even before the
accident. For example, the behavioral pattern of vehicle
after maintenance (e.g., steering ability, braking distance)
or a previously reported malfunctioning component of
a vehicle can provide important clues to determine the
faulty party.
• Lightweightness: The system should have minimum
overhead on endpoints since it includes multiple parties
that may have different capabilities and resources.
• Privacy: The system should preserve the privacy of the
participants while also providing the flexibility for the
participants to selectively reveal their data as they wish.
B. B4F Framework
To enable the vehicular forensics vision, we introduce
a novel blockhchain forensic framework shown in Fig. 3.
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The framework connects the following stakeholders: vehicles,
maintenance service providers (e.g., mechanics), vehicle man-
ufacturers, law enforcement and insurance companies. The
key features of the envisioned vehicular forensics system
mentioned in the previous subsection guided us while building
the blockchain-based vehicular forensics system.
At the heart of design, there is a special forensic daemon,
which is stationed within the OBU and constantly retrieves
data from EDR, BSMs (i.e., messages received from other
vehicles) and on-board sensors/IoT devices through CAN
Bus. The forensic daemon periodically shares the EDR and
BSM data with the insurance company through an encrypted
channel. Note that, only related BSMs are shared when an
EDR triggering event occurs. On the other hand, the car
manufacturers collect regular car diagnostic reports. A cryp-
tographic hash of these data is submitted to Blockchain for
removing single trust issue. Both insurance companies and
manufacturers collect those data for analysis. Moreover, main-
tenance records are kept at the maintenance service providers,
and a hash of each record is submitted to Blockchain in the
same manner. As an optional extension to the framework all of
mentioned data can also be stored on a personal cloud storage.
Stored data will be used in post-accident scenarios by
allowing the parties to disclose their data selectively to de-
termine the faulty party. Law enforcement authorities play
an investigative role for post-accident scenarios while parties
disclose their data with proof of integrity.
C. Potential accident scene
An investigator working on an accident scene needs to
collect all pieces of clues to reconstruct the accident scene.
Once the accident scene is reconstructed, the faulty party can
be determined accordingly.
Here, we discuss how digital data provided by B4F assist an
investigation. Assume that an accident scene where Vehicle 1
(V1) collided with Vehicle 2 (V2) at an intersection with traffic
lights as illustrated in Fig. 4 (a). The data provided by B4F
may enable various forensically sound scene reconstructions
as listed below:
• Reconstructed Scene (b): BSM messages include the
traffic light status and cars’ last positions. In this scenario,
BSM messages reveal that V1 started to turn left when
the red light was on as shown in Fig. 4 (b). Lights status
are being disseminated by the smart traffic lights and
thus when the accident happens, B4F would have stored
the last BSM messages from the traffic lights. Here, data
clearly points out that the V1 is the faulty party.
• Reconstructed Scene (c): Timestamped data in B4F
reveals the existence of another vehicle in the accident
scene. Drivers of V1 and V2 started crossing the road
when the light turned to green. At that time V3 did not
stop at red light and caused V2 lost its control to hit V1.
B4F data uncovers the existence of V3 and resolves such
a hit case where faulty party is a third car that run out
of the incident area.
• Reconstructed Scene (d): Similar to Scene (c), data
reveals the existence of V3. However, this time none of
the cars violate the rules as the traffic light for V3 is also
green. BSM data supplied from smart traffic lights would
reveal faulty signalization as the cause of the accident.
• Reconstructed Scene (e): In this scenario B4F data
indicates that none of the drivers violates the traffic
rules. However, by investigating the car diagnostic report
history on B4F, the investigator finds out that after main-
tenance, the vehicle has pulling problem while braking.
Due to this faulty operation in V1, the driver lost the
control of the car and hit V2. The history of previous
vehicle maintenance records helps to resolve this com-
plicated scenario and suggests maintenance provider as
the faulty party.
• Reconstructed Scene (f): In this scenario, B4F data
shows that V1 was on the autopilot at the accident time.
Moreover, the diagnostic records report a failed sensor.
Thus, V1 autopilot software with faulty input caused the
accident which suggests car manufacturer as the faulty
party.
Various parties might be involved in an accident like exem-
plified above. Forensic data provided by B4F provides a fast
and efficient accident scene reconstruction which helps any
investigation significantly.
IV. B4F COMPONENTS
In this section, we first describe the forensics elements and
data types and then we move on to elaborate on the specific
elements of B4F that relates to the blockchain structure, its
membership management, and storage issues.
A. Forensic Daemon
Here, we explain how the proposed forensic daemon inter-
acts with different components of a vehicle. Note that our
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forensic daemon runs as an application in OBU thanks to
existing SDKs for custom application development.
The OBU has a read access to the vehicle network infras-
tructure. The backbone of the vehicle network is the CAN
bus. In a modern vehicle, many important sub-structures like
steering wheel motor, braking system, throttle, tire pressure
monitoring system, seat belt buckle status even windshield
wipers are controlled and monitored via CAN bus. Thus, the
CAN bus may deliver invaluable data in terms of vehicular
forensics to the OBU which can be retrieved by the forensic
daemon.
Additionally, through Wi-Fi or Bluetooth interfaces, the
forensic daemon can receive data from the driver about his/her
health status via wearables. Similarly, road conditions and
weather data can be retrieved from RSUs or driver’s smart
phone that has applications related to such data.
The forensic daemon will collect data on predefined occa-
sions based on basic or custom rules. After adding a times-
tamp, it will sign the data using pseudonym certificate which
is readily available in the OBU. In case of an investigation,
submitted data will be disclosed for investigation by the user.
B. Forensic data types and B4F process
In this sub-section, we detail the interaction between vehicle
and the B4F framework. There are 3 types of data in our
framework. The first one is event data which is occurred in
case of an incident triggered by the predefined conditions in
EDR. The second one is the diagnosis data which is produced
by the vehicle periodically or in case of a failure. Finally, there
is a maintenance data which contains information about the
maintenance report and kept by both maintenance service and
user. Maintenance data is signed by both the vehicle and the
maintenance provider so is a multi-signature data. We have
two data submission processes in the B4F. As described in
Section IV.E, the content of forensic data along with time
and pseudonym vehicle ID is signed by vehicle and submitted
to the corresponding parties such as insurance companies,
manufacturers and personal cloud storage. While the content
of the forensic data is kept between two parties, the hash of this
data is stored in shared ledger on blockchain. B4F implements
a gossip network where each vehicle selects a random set of
validators to gossip hash of data. To ensure that messages are
valid, every message is signed by the pseudonym identity of
the vehicle; validators check that the signature is valid before
relaying it. The randomly chosen leader propose a block in
submitted transactions and distributes its block of pending
transactions through the gossip protocol again. B4F establishes
a byzantine agreement to reach the finality.
C. Blockchain Structure
To address the requirements of Section III-A, we propose
utilizing permissioned blockchain technology and implement
shared and fragmented ledgers to securely and efficiently
exchange information between the collaborating parties.
In our proposed blockchain, we will have four different
types of nodes: 1) Leader; 2) Validator; 3) Monitor units and
4) Client as shown in Fig. 5.
A leader is selected randomly every block time among
the validator nodes (i.e. manufacturers, maintenance centers,
insurance companies). The client, i.e. vehicle, provides signed
transactions to the B4F to ensure that messages cannot be
forged.
The randomly chosen leader proposes a block to the network
based on the transactions it has received. To reach a consensus
on a proposed block, validators run byzantine agreement proto-
cols such as PBFT. These protocols are resilient to malicious
actions of the leader and participants [?]. Monitor units are
law enforcement authorities who do not directly participate in
validation process, but keep the replica of the shared ledger
to be able to participate in post-accident disputes.
6Fig. 5. Permissioned blockchain participants.
This proposed framework is geared for increasing the level
of trust among network participants and thus will eliminate
the need to a trusted third party.
Due to use of hashes, the overhead of the building and
storing replicated shared ledger among parties is minimized.
Note that the integrity of data can be verified by comparing
its hash value with the corresponding hashes that are stored
on the Blockchain.
D. Integrated Membership Management and Privacy via
Pseudonym Certificates
In a public blockchain anyone can participate either as a
client or as a validator (e.g. miners in cryptocurrencies). How-
ever, in case of a permissioned blockchain, access permission
is strictly controlled by membership service and only granted
users are able to make transactions. The identities issued by
membership service are unique and can not be altered. Thus,
there is no support to protect privacy between interacting
peers. Leveraging permissioned-blockchain impedes the use
of anonymous identities contrary to identities used in public
Blockchain such as Bitcoin. This is particularly important
in our case, since the vehicle owners would like to protect
their privacy while sharing data with their manufacturers and
insurance companies. On the other hand, the huge number of
network participants (e.g., millions of vehicles on the roads)
expose membership management as a challenge in realization
of permissioned blockchain.
Thus, we use pseudonym identities from VPKI model
suggested in IEEE 1609.2 as a token for clients to satisfy
anonymity (i.e., vehicles) in the proposed B4F. According
to the VPKI scheme, the vehicle has different pseudonym
identities for different time intervals (i.e, every 5 minutes),
thus every transaction will be submitted with different identity
which protects the user privacy as defined in the attack model
of IEEE 1609.2. However, regulations and policies should
be assessed for a proper disclosure of the user data. In
addition, exploiting VPKI scheme also addresses mentioned
membership management challenge. Any vehicle that has
a valid pseudonym identity can make transactions on the
proposed Blockchain, since participants of B4F recognizes
valid certificates produced by VPKI. Validator nodes check
Fig. 6. An Overview of Proposed Ledger Structure. SL represents
shared ledger while FL represents fragmented ledgers which can hold
different data.
the validity of the certificate and timestamp of the submitted
data (i.e., hash of the forensic data). If the timestamp belongs
to the certificate validity period (i.e., every 5 minutes), the
transaction is confirmed. The consensus on valid transactions
is achieved by a computationally inexpensive voting-based
byzantine agreement scheme among validators.
E. Lightweight Fragmented Ledger for Forensic Participants
Blockchain is a shared ledger that maintains a growing list
of blocks that are chained to each other. Each participant stores
a copy of the entire history. In our case, the data are immense
and thus the shared ledger can grow dramatically and may
cause both communication and storage overhead.
To address this issue, we utilize a fragmented ledger instead
of storing all forensic data in shared ledger. The motivation
comes from the observation that each party has already stored
a different fragment of required data. For instance, a mainte-
nance provider may not be interested in the content of periodic
EDR data and thus there is no need to keep that content in
shared ledger. On the contrary, as insurance companies keep
EDR data in their fragmented ledger, keeping proof of that
data in the shared ledger is sufficient. Therefore, in B4F,
all participants of the network will have a consensus on the
shared ledger. However, each participant maintains just related
information which differs from others as shown in Fig. 6.
Specifically, the difference between the shared and fragmented
ledgers will be on forensic data details. The shared ledger does
not carry any information related to the forensic content of
EDR&BSM data, car diagnostic reports, provided maintenance
etc.
Additionally, note that the user may want to refuse to submit
maintenance or manufacturer data content. Instead, s/he keeps
it in a personal cloud storage. However, based on regulations
and policies, in case of an incident, the authorities will require
the user to disclose this data as needed, integrity of which is
satisfied by the Blockchain.
V. FUTURE RESEARCH ISSUES
As there is a growing research on various aspects of
connected vehicles, their applications will be proliferated in
the upcoming years such as driverless cars and automated
7fleets. This may result in increased disputes as a result of
their incidents. Therefore, we believe that there is a vast
opportunity to pursue additional research with respect to
vehicular forensics in general and our framework in particular.
We list them below:
• There will be a need to analyze the storage and commu-
nication overhead of B4F framework by implementing it
using an OBU SDK.
• A punishment/incentive/avoidance mechanism should be
investigated to prevent the members to become malicious
actors. In this regard, a detection mechanism should be
developed to discover malicious participants.
• The B4F provides a lightweight solution by just keeping
hash values. While this ensures integrity and immutability
of forensic data, the availability of this data depends on
the individual storage and shared counterparts. There is
no mechanism for ensuring availability of critical foren-
sic data on blockchain. Therefore, this warrants further
research.
• Due to increased availability of data and blockchain
technologies in various domains for forensic purposes,
researcher would need to consider forensic-by-design
principle when proposing new systems and mechanisms.
• Regulations for enforcing the participation of various en-
tities to forensic blockchains and development of policies
to use such data in criminal cases are potential research
issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed constructing a blockchain infras-
tructure to provide comprehensive forensic services for acci-
dent investigations. To address the issues regarding the over-
head of storage and membership management of blockchain,
we proposed using VPKI in permissioned blockchain and
fragmented ledger which enables storage of hashed data in
the shared ledger while the details are stored in fragmented
ledgers as non-hashed data. In addition, the use of pseudonyms
for identities help preserve privacy of the users.
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